GLOBAL POLICY BRIEFING

The Current State of European Union's Governance & the Potential for Greater Political Integration

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KEY POINTS

+ This Global Policy Briefing provides an in depth analysis of the current levels of political organisation in Europe (i.e. national, European, regional, subnational, municipal).

+ It investigates the different conceptualisations of the EU (i.e. federalism, confederalism, consociationalism, multi-level governance, international organisation), and raises critical points regarding the future of European Integration.

 + It elaborates on the institutional complexity of the EU by analysing exclusive, shared and state competences, as well as the impact and application of EU treaties.

 + It states that Europe is currently lacking a clear vision and direction, according to which the European project should be developed.

+ Lastly, it provides policy recommendations, based on the findings of academic literature and existing studies in the field of European politics, regarding the lack of politicisation at the EU level, the lack of European demos and the democratic deficit.

KEY WORDS

European Union, member states, political organisation, federalism, confederalism, consociationalism, multi-level governance, European vision, European integration, levels of government, European demos, democratic deficit, Lisbon Treaty, Euroscepticism, Europeanisation, intergovernmental cooperation, Manuel Barroso, Herman Van Rompuy, MEP's, Committee of the Regions, European Affairs Committees, Treaty of Rome, Treaty of Amsterdam, Treaty of Nice, Constitutional Treaty.

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PREFACE
By Gold Mercury President
Nicolas De Santis

Our present world is complex, unstable and very fragile. At Gold Mercury, we believe that the EU is a necessity in order to create a more stable world. The European Union, which currently includes 28 member states, is a miracle of Global Governance in our complex world. But, as with all great things, we take most of its achievements for granted. But think about it for a moment...

THE EU - A GROWING FAMILY OF UNITED MINDS

For starters, the EU has maintained peace in Western Europe for 68 years since the Second World War. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, most Eastern European countries joined the EU, including: Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and the Czech Republic.

The EU now also includes countries which went to war after the former Yugoslavia broke up in the 1990's, such as Slovenia and Croatia. Soon it will include many more; with some countries on the road to joining and others which have already applied to join, such as Serbia, Kosovo*, Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Uniting Western and Eastern Europe and former Yugoslavian countries under one roof in modern times, is nothing short of a miracle.

All of these countries could have chosen a different path; going out on their own or joining others, but instead they chose to join and belong to the EU. This is because the EU stands for liberty, progress and modernity; representing peace, stability and strength in unity.

Non-EU nations believe in the EU and its key role as a world stabiliser.

They believe in this so much so, that even the U.S. White House and Japanese Government have come to its defence recently to remind EU nations how important the EU is for them and the world. This happened most recently when the UK Government proposed a future referendum on whether to remain in the EU or not. Obama stated that: *"the United States values a strong UK in a strong European Union, which makes critical contributions to peace, prosperity, and security in Europe and around the world."* The Japanese embassy in London argued that a large portion of Japanese investment in the UK and other EU nations was for the purpose of access to the single market: *"More than 1,300 Japanese companies have invested in the UK, as part of the single market of the EU, and have created 130,000 jobs, more than anywhere else in Europe. This fact demonstrates that the advantage of the UK as a gateway to the European market has attracted Japanese investment."*

THE EURO - MORE THAN A CURRENCY

Of the 28 EU nations, 17 share a single currency: the Euro. More nations will join the Euro soon, increasing its power and influence. The Euro has become a global currency, second only to the dollar. To deny this fact, or to imply that the Euro could disappear - is to confuse, misrepresent, and misinform. It is to lie.

Some said that the Euro would break up, or that Greece would leave the Euro to save itself. This has not happened, despite the fact that speculators and banking advisors to failing governments always propose this, as a quick option to regain monetary control and devalue their currency.

They propose this in the belief that cheapening a country's currency and controlling interest rates again could magically save failed economies.

Anyone can understand that in a globalised world, this is short-term thinking with many irreversible consequences. Imagine if the state of Texas seceded and left the Dollar behind; and then created its own currency, because the US economy was weak (which it currently is). There would be no more US Federal aid or investment. Without this now "foreign" investment, government funding would be accounted for via increased taxation. With these severed ties and the increased taxation, the high skilled tech workers, lawyers, doctors and filmmakers would

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* Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/99 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

geographical proximity is the highest influencing factor on national trade, the new Texan currency would likely be worthless. Though an extreme example, it shows some of the potential chains of negative consequences and events which are associated with leaving such complex international organisations.

The Euro is not to blame for Europe's financial problems, as these are derived from a self-inflicted global crisis, national government incompetence and lack of proper financial control governance mechanisms. The Euro is now one of the strongest currencies in the world beyond the Eurozone area. The Euro is the second most actively traded currency in foreign exchange markets; it is a counterpart in around 40% of the daily transactions which take place. Despite Europe's financial crisis, new countries like Latvia have chosen to join the Euro rather than keep their own currency. This is not seen as a loss of sovereignty for Latvia; that would be short-term thinking; but is instead seen as a gain in access to a global market and a Union of shared interests and values.

The Euro, like other currencies, will be strong one day and weaker on another day, but will always remain a strong symbol of unity and progress nonetheless. In today's financial circumstances, we need less global speculation and more stable global currencies. The Euro is a representative of this important ideal.

WHY A BRAND EU - EUROPEAN UNION BRAND CENTRE?

The EU, like other international organisations, or national governments, is not perfect; and it never will be. But we at Gold Mercury believe that a strong European Union has provided, and will continue to provide, an incredible global public good of peace and great stability for us all in an increasingly unstable world.

The EU is a success story in global governance, but the BRAND EU is not well managed, understood or communicated. It is a great product but presently - very difficult to understand and poorly communicated. This lack of 'brand management' reduces citizen support and puts the entire purpose of the EU at risk: allowing anti-EU forces to attack it, without much sign of a defence. We aim to change this by providing an independent

communications and EU brand policy programme to debate the EU. Gold Mercury wants to guarantee that the people of Europe, and beyond, understand the BRAND EU, and understand the universal values which its member states have chosen to represent and defend. Values like liberty, democracy, solidarity, human rights and the rule of law. These are the values that the EU exports to the world; the values that all global citizens of goodwill aspire to. The EU's values are universal and global. The BRAND EU is therefore a global brand and a guarantor of these values.

ROLE OF THE BRAND EU - EUROPEAN UNION BRAND CENTRE

With the above in mind, the role of the BRAND EU Centre includes the following areas:
1/ Clarify the current state of European Union brand identity and clarify its vision in the world.
2/ Assist in the strategic positioning and promotion of the BRAND EU as a leading global brand of unity within the EU and in the world.
3/ Clarify how the EU works and improve EU communications and understanding.
4/ Shed light on the myths surrounding the EU and provide a neutral ground for EU debate.
5/ Monitor the EU Brand and report on its progress.

The EU recently won the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize for advancing peace, democracy and human rights in modern times. We believe that if we are able to clearly communicate what the EU really is and what it stands for in the world, all Europeans (and non-Europeans) will increase their support and involvement in the European project.

Please join us in this endeavour.

Nicolas De Santis
President of Gold Mercury International

FOREWORD
By Enrique Baron Crespo, Former President of the European Parliament

Let me begin with the sound advice of Seneca: *"the life of those that forget the past, neglect the present and fear the future is very brief and painful".*

In the current European situation, it means that we must not underestimate the importance of a united Europe or of the European elections of 2014. The risk of neglect, increasing voter abstention or fearing the rise of populisms, can be a chance to create a new decisive momentum to overcome the crisis and reinforce the European Project.

We must not forget the past. The elections will take place in the centennial of the suicide that Europe committed with the beginning in 1914 of the Great War that concluded in 1945. Nearly a hundred million victims all over the world.

Since then, we have lived the longest period of peace in our common history, thanks to the construction of a United Europe, built on the principles and values of parliamentarian democracy, the system most despised by all the dictatorships that Europe suffered in the 20th Century. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 is the recognition of this achievement. Let us not forget the past.

Let us also not neglect the present, or fear the future. The work of the BRAND EU Centre is vitally important for creating this new decisive momentum, and overcoming our adversities – to generate a more stable, secure and even further united Europe. A stronger union, a louder voice, and a tougher brand are all needed to move the Union forward into the future with its head held high – the BRAND EU Centre aims to facilitate development of these three crucial areas.

By strengthening the European Brand through a diverse range of engagements and campaigns, our aim is to show everyone; be they a Eurosceptic, an abstaining voter, or a popular politician, that a stronger union is absolutely the way forward, for all of us. At this critical juncture where the future of European peace and cooperation is at stake, the work of the BRAND EU Centre has never been more important. Our aim is to strengthen the common European identity built around values of democracy, liberty, peace and modernity. In doing so, we hope that we can make the future of Europe more secure and stable; something quite rare in these troubling times.

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Clarifying the Complexity Surrounding the EU and its Political Structure

INTRODUCTION

In 2013, it is obvious that the European Union (EU) is in a state of crisis. The future of the common currency has been put into question. More importantly, harsh austerity measures in the countries of the periphery, and constantly evolving rescue packages have arguably made public opinion in both the South and the North of the continent more critical of the European project. It seems that mutual distrust and misunderstanding among the people of Europe has risen, and the future of European integration and of further expansion seems uncertain. Arguably, what Europe needs in these times of crisis is not only a practical, step-by-step approach of 'muddling through', but a clear vision of the direction in which the European project should develop. Even though European integration was traditionally characterised by the cautious approach associated with Jean Monnet, there have always been famous Europeans, who advocated a big step forward in integration, political union, and indeed, European federalism. These include figures as diverse as the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,

Italian politician Altiero Spinelli and the former German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer.

But since even earlier in European history, there has been long tradition of a close form of political union in Europe, articulated by historical figures such as William Penn. This global policy briefing aims to recall the ideas of these men and, together with insights from academic literature, to apply them to the current European position. How can a step towards European federalism provide a long-term solution to the problems faced by Europe? What are the problems associated with such a bold step of integration? What alternatives does the academic literature provide to a fully-fledged federal system? How is the federalisation of Europe related to the emergence of a common European identity? In contrast to traditional federal states, such as the US, the European Union is characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity of member states, in regards to their political systems, state structure and internal organisations.

In order to answer these questions and provide an outlook for the future of the EU, this global policy briefing starts by: 1) describing the historical and political heterogeneity of Europe. It will then move on to 2) elaborate on the various treaties in the history of European integration, how they impact on the domestic order of the member states and the way the competences of the EU and the member states are interlinked. The next section will 3) elaborate on different models of political organisation within and between states, such as: federalism, confederalism, consociationalism, multi-level governance and intergovernmental cooperation in the form of an international organisation; and will discuss the extent to which the EU already has characteristics of each of them.

The fourth section will 4) compare the EU to existing federal states, such as the United States and Germany. The fifth section will 5) discuss the various historical ideas of European federalism, and will elaborate on how new ideas and concepts from the academic literature might help us to overcome the problems of the current situation. Is federalism a viable option? Can it be realised without a common European demos? What alternatives are there? The last section offers some brief conclusions.

The most important law-making institutions of the European Level, are the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament.

1. The diversity of political organisation in Europe

These differences are the result of centuries of independent historical development, geography and culture. Thus, the 28 EU member states, and the six countries already given candidate status, vary greatly regarding their political organisation. As will be further explored in the next section, this variation in political systems has also determined the impact which the EU has on each member state (Boerzel, 1999, p. 573). At the same time, the political institutions of the member states have, to some extent, also been changed by the impact of the European Union: a phenomenon called 'Europeanisation' (Hix and Goetz, 2000, p. 15). Therefore, it is critical to differentiate between the varying levels of political organisation that are witnessed in Europe. There are potentially four different tiers of political organisation in Europe.

Europe: Four Levels of Government

1) First, the European or EU level, at which all EU member states are represented. The three most important law-making institutions at the European level are a) the European Commission, b) the Council of the European Union and c) the European Parliament. In addition, there is d) the European Council, which consists of the heads of state of EU member states. It determines the general strategic direction of the EU, but has no law-making powers (European Union, 2012).

The European Parliament (EP) is the only directly elected body of the European Union. The elections for the European Parliament take place every five years. The number of Members of Parliament (MPs) a country sends to the EP depends on its size, and ranges from 5 for Malta to 99 for Germany. The European Parliament has gained significant rights in subsequent Treaty Reforms (Scully, 2007, p. 80). Moreover, the European Parliament oversees and scrutinises the work of the European Commission, and elects the President of the Commission, currently José Manuel Barroso (ibid.).

The Commission can be considered the executive of the European Union (Egeberg, 2007, p. 140). It has the sole right to initiate legislation and it represents the European Union in outside negotiations (Egeberg, 2007, p. 142).

In the Council of the European Union (also known as the Council of Ministers), the representatives of the member states of the European Union meet. The Council of the European Union meets in different configurations

with respective ministers, according to the subject being discussed (Lewis, 2007, p. 155).

For example, in the Agricultural and Fisheries Council (Agrifish), all the agricultural ministers meet, whereas in the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states meet. The Presidency of the Council of the European Union rotates between the member states every six months (Lewis, 2007, p. 160). Together with the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union acts as the bicameral legislator of the European Union (Hix and Hoyland, 2011, p. 74).

Besides these three law-making institutions, the European Council, which consists of the heads of state of the member states and the President of the Commission,

plays an important role. It determines the general political course of the EU, but has no law-making powers. It meets every six months and is chaired by the President of the European Council: currently Herman Van Rompuy (European Union, 2012). Other important institutions of the EU include the Committee of the Regions (CoR), in which subnational entities are represented.

2) The second level of government is the national level, or the level of the central state. A common feature in terms of the political organisation of the EU member states at the national level, is that all member states excluding Cyprus (which has a presidential system), France, and to some extent Finland (which have semi-Presidential systems), are parliamentary democracies.

THE DIVERSITY OF POLITICAL ORGANISATION IN EUROPE - FOUR LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

2 NATION STATES (28)

3 REGIONS (353)[1]

4 CITIES (300+)[2] (MUNICIPAL LEVEL)

1 EUROPEAN UNION

EU Commission

The Executive

Council of the European Union (elected by governments)

Upper chamber

European Parliament (directly elected)

Lower chamber

+ Made up of mostly Parliamentary Republics and Constitutional Monarchies (such as the UK or Spain).

+ Some nation states have bicameral systems (lower and upper houses), like the UK, France & Spain. Other states are unicameral (one chamber), such as Bulgaria.

+ Most countries in the EU are unitary states (governed as one single unit). Some unitary states also include federal elements, such as the UK (countries within a country like Scotland) or Spain's autonomous region system.

+ Some EU countries are fully federal states, such as Belgium, Austria & Germany.

+ City council & authorities.

+ 70% of the EU population live in urban areas.

[1] Committee of EU Regions
[2] Urban Audit: Core Cities of More Than 250,000 Inhabitants (Eurostat)

EU - FOUR TYPES OF GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS

	Type of System	Description	Country Examples
1	Presidential Republic	The President is both the head of state & government	Cyprus
2	Semi-Presidential Republic	One President and one Prime Minister share competences	France, Portugal, Romania
3	Parliamentary Republic	+ President as figurehead with few political competences + Prime Minister is head of government	Italy, Germany, Greece, Ireland
4	Parliamentary Democratic Constitutional Monarchy	+ Monarch is head of state within guidelines of constitution + Prime Minister is head of government	Spain, UK, Sweden, Netherlands

Today, a slight majority of member states have unicameral systems (i.e. only one chamber of parliament), while there is still a substantial minority of bicameral systems. There is strong variation among the member states regarding the extent to which the national parliaments are involved in overseeing EU affairs, for example by setting up European Affairs Committees (EACs) (Bergmann, 2000; Raunio, 2005). The member states also differ greatly in the way they coordinate their policies towards the EU at the national, executive level (Kassim et al. 2000, 2002; Gaertner, Hoerner and Obholzer, 2011). There are various other aspects in which the EU member states differ at the national level: different legal systems, bureaucratic traditions and political economies, to name but a few.

3) Arguably, we can find even a larger variation between different member states when we look at the regional, or subnational level. In terms of state structure, or levels of political organisation, we can identify several groups of member states tyf the European Union. There are three fully-fledged federal states in the European Union: Austria, Germany and Belgium. Moreover, three countries have devolved considerable amounts of

autonomy to regions or other constituent entities: Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. The other 21 member states are basically unitary states, even though virtually all have at least some administrative regions and there has been a trend towards some transfer of power to lower levels of government even in these countries, for example in France or Poland. All of the six current candidate countries also fall into this category.

The powers between the different subnational entities are therefore vastly different across the EU. The German Länder have larger competences, for example in the realm of education, and the Belgian regions have even more powers and even sometimes represent the interests of Belgium in lieu of the central government. In contrast, the regions of Portugal are much weaker. The reasons for the development of federal structures are largely historical. Germany has a strong history of small, independent states ('Kleinstaaterei'), which were only united in 1871, whereas France has a long tradition of a strong central state and central government. The same applies for the vast majority of the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), which are also

EU - FOUR TYPES OF GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS

	UNITARY STATES	FEDERATIONS
DEFINITION	+ Governed as one single unit, in which the central government is supreme. + Sub units have the powers that the central government chooses to delegate. + Some unitary states also include federal elements, such as the UK or Spain.	+ A union of partially self-governing states united by a division of power as defined by a constitution or a treaty.
EXAMPLES	+ UK + Spain + Greece + Portugal + Bulgaria + Ireland	+ U.S.A. + Brazil + India + Russia + Mexico + EU + Germany + Belgium + Austria

mostly centralised states. Whilst in some countries, such as Germany, all subnational entities have the same rights, there are also cases of asymmetric federalism. Therefore, some of the autonomous communities in Spain have more competences than others. For example, the Basque Country and Navarra enjoy far-reaching fiscal autonomy (Agrenoff, 2006, p. 4). In the UK, Scotland has more autonomy than Wales or England. In contrast to Scotland and Wales, England does not have its own assembly (Jeffrey and Wincott, 2006, p. 4).

4) The final level of organisation is the municipal level. Arguably, this level of organisation is, all in all, the least relevant when it comes to the relationship between the European Union and the member states, and will therefore not be considered in more detail in this Global Policy Briefing.

Therefore, the diversity of political systems and levels of organisation at the national level means that the EU cannot be compared to a classical federation, such as the US, in which the political structure of subnational entities is more or less similar. However, the different arrangements of state structure are often the result of historical particularities, economic developments and sometimes, newly emerged regionalist sentiments. Arguably, the strong variance in political structure and systems could also make the step towards a fully-fledged federation or political union difficult.

Given historical embededness and the endurance of state structure in the member states, a complete territorial reorganisation of the member states is of course unlikely. However, some authors state that European integration has itself led to an increased interaction between the regional level and the EU (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p. 4). Hooghe and Marks argue that some EU policies, most importantly monetary transfers in the form of structural funds, which are to a large extent channelled to the regions, have in some instances favoured devolution and strengthened the regions vis-à-vis the central state (p. 85). As a result, the EU is seen as an entity which is characterised by links between the various levels of political organisation: a state referred to as 'multi-level governance'. This theme will be analysed in more detail in the following section.

2. The impact of the EU treaties on the internal organisation of the member states

Through the existing Treaties, the European Union deeply influences the internal legal order of the member states, and arguably also their internal organisation, policies and political culture. In the academic literature, this phenomenon is referred to as 'Europeanisation' (see Olsen, 2002). This section of this Global Policy Briefing will 1) summarise the different EU Treaties and the subsequent steps of integration. It will then 2) continue to give examples of policies which are exclusive competences of the European Union, 3) competences shared between the European Union and the member states and 4) the policies which remain exclusive competences of the member states. The last subsection will 5) analyse which aspects of the member states political system are most influenced by the European Union, building on the Europeanisation literature.

The History of European Integration

The earliest predecessor of today's European Union: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), joined the production of coal and steel of the original six member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) under the supervision of a common High Authority. Arguably, Jean Monnet recognised the ECSC as a first step of integration, which in the long run would lead to a political union (Urwin, 2003, p. 19).

The Maastricht treaty (1993) represented a major reform of the institutional structure of the European Union, and also laid the foundations for the European Monetary Union (EMU) and eventually the Euro.

In 1958, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom, which was meant to oversee the common peaceful use of nuclear energy. The EEC laid down the foundation for the Common Market and already had the goal to 'lay the foundation of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' (Urwin, 2003, p. 21). After the Empty Chair

Crisis in the mid-1960s, when French President Charles De Gaulle withdrew his representative from the Council in order to prevent the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), the Community entered in a period of stagnation known as 'Eurosclerosis' in the 1970s. However, during that time, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the Community. In the mid 1980s, European integration gained pace again with the Single European Act (SEA). The SEA laid the foundation for a common economic and monetary policy and extended the competences to a range of new policy areas (e.g. environment, research and development, economic and social cohesion) (Phinnemore, 2003, p. 32).

Even further reaching integration was achieved with the Treaty on European Union (TEU), also known as the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force on November 1st, 1993. This treaty represented a major reform of the institutional structure of the Community, or European Union as it was henceforth known, and also laid the foundation for the European Monetary Union (EMU) and eventually the Euro (ibid.). Moreover, additional competences were transferred to the European level: notably in the fields of education, culture, public health, consumer protection, trans-European networks industry and development help (p. 33).

The following years saw frequent Treaty revisions and changes, in the form of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2000). In 2005, the so-called Constitutional Treaty (CT)– which would have given the European Union a 'Constitution' and other symbols usually associated with some form of statehood was rejected by referendums in the Netherlands and in France. However, most of the substantial changes envisaged by the CT, such as a stronger participation of national parliaments in the EU, were transferred in the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1st December, 2009.

An important principle with regard to EU law is that the Union only enjoys the competences which were conferred to it by the Treaties (Tobler and Beglinger, 2008, p. 58; Art. 4 and 5 TEU). Normally these competences are exclusively attributed to the Union in the Treaties, but in exceptional circumstances they

can also be extended by a broad interpretation of legal bases by the European Court of Justice (the so-called implicit attribution) (ibid.).

EU Competences Vs. State Competences

There are two types of EU competences: exclusive competences and shared competences. In the case of exclusive competences, all powers are given to the EU, and the member states cannot normally act anymore in this domain. Examples include the Common Commercial Policy, the Common Agricultural Policy or Monetary Policy in the case of Eurozone countries (Art. 3 TFEU). Other competences are shared between the EU and the member states, for example development cooperation (Art. 4 TFEU).

There is also a mix of exclusive, shared and member states competences at the EU, as it is the case in many federations such as the Federal Republic of Germany or the United States of America.

In these cases, the principle of 'occupying the field' applies: as soon as the field is occupied by EU law, the member states have lost their competences (Tobler and Beglinger, 2008, p. 59). Some competences remain exclusively the competences of the member states, for example national defence, even though some intergovernmental cooperation also takes place in this regard in the form of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). With the Lisbon Treaty entering into force, the post of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was created, currently occupied by Catherine Ashton. The High Representative is the Vice President of the European Commission and chairs the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council. His role can be compared to that of a 'foreign minister of the European Union'.

The European Union therefore heavily penetrates the legal order of the member states. There is also a mix of exclusive, shared and member states competences, as it is the case in many federations such as the Federal Republic of Germany or the United States of America. But arguably, the impact of the EU on the member states is not purely legalistic. Many scholars argue that the EU also impacts on other aspects of the member states, a phenomenon called 'Europeanisation'. The EU can therefore have a key influence on the polity of the member states, for example in the form of empowering regions through structural funds, as argued by the proponents of multi-level governance (e.g Hooghe and Marks, 2001) or the disempowerment of national parliaments (e.g. Moravcsik, 1994; Maurer and Wessels, 2001). Moreover, the EU can have an impact on the policies of the member states, for example in the form of convergence of policies which are regulated by the EU. An example of a field with a high degree of Europeanisation is environmental policy (Sprungk, 2010, p. 12). However, the impact of the EU on the politics of the member states, for example on political parties (Mair, 2000) - generally seems to be less profound than the impact on polity and policies (Hix and Goetz, 2000, p. 15).

However, the impact of the EU on the member states does not seem to be homogenous, but seems to vary (see for e.g. Boerzel and Risse, 2003). Thus, when a policy in a member state is particularly at odds with the European 'template', a member state might experience especially strong pressure to adapt to the common European framework, compared to a member state whose provisions are already more in line with European provisions. As a result, it becomes obvious that the impact of the EU on the member states is plentiful, and in some sense even akin to shared competences in a federal state. In the next section, we will analyse to what extent the EU can be referred to as a federal entity.

3. Different types of decentralised political entities

In this section, five different models of political organisation are explained in detail, and features an analysis as to what extent the EU can be compared to each of these categories. The different models are federalism, confederalism, consociationalism, multi-level governance (MLG) and inter-governmental cooperation in the form of an international organisation (IO). While it is argued that the EU does not neatly fit any of these categories at the moment, it does possess some elements of each one of them, depending on the policy field in question and the perspective one is taking.

Federation

There are a number of different definitions of what constitutes federalism. According to one definition, federalism is 'a system of government which unites separate states while allowing each to have a substantial degree of autonomy' (Oxford English Reference Dictionary, in Burgess, 2003, p. 67). Another important characteristic is that the importance of decentralised power is emphasised (ibid.). As we have seen above, this definition fits the EU to a large extent. Arguably, a federal system, or the 'United States of Europe', has frequently been seen as the end vision or 'finalité' of the European Union (Burgess, 2003, p. 65). However, in other respects the EU cannot be called a federation yet. Although the EU has an official European flag (with twelve stars), a European anthem (Ode to Joy from Beethoven's 9th symphony), a currency

Although the EU has an official **European flag** (with twelve stars), a **European anthem** (Ode to Joy from Beethoven's 9th symphony), **a currency** (the Euro) and even **Europe Da**y (9th of May), these symbols have failed to truly engage with citizens of Europe as their content and meaning are unclear.

(the Euro) and even Europe Day every 9th of May (not an EU or national holiday), these symbols have failed to truly engage with citizens of Europe as their content and meaning are unclear.

The EU is also lacking critical symbols of true statehood, which are typically counted as characteristics of a federal state: such as a formal constitution or a head of state (Burgess, 2003, p. 71). Therefore, we can say that the EU at the moment does not fulfil all of the criteria to be called a full federation.

Confederation

Another, looser form of territorial organisation is called a confederation. Classical examples of confederations include the United States in its early political days, as well as the German Bund before 1871. A confederation distinguishes itself from a federation in that the power of the central government is weaker, and the power of the member states is in turn higher (Burgess, 2003, p. 68). In fact, in a confederation, there is no direct link between the central (or federal) government and the citizens, but only between the citizens and the member states (ibid.). In that sense, there is not a strong central government, but interactions between different member states' representatives at the highest level (p. 69).

To some extent the EU displays certain characteristics of this form of government, for example in the forums where representatives of the different member states negotiate. However, at the same time the EU has a direct link to the citizens, in the form of the European Parliament (EP). As such, the EU cannot fully be qualified as representing the confederal model, even though it clearly has some characteristics of this type of political entity.

Consociational Model

Another, less popularly known concept of political organisation is the so-called consociational model. The term was coined by the political scientist Arend Lijphart (1969). Lijphart described consociationalism as a form of government in (ethnically) divided societies, where elite representatives of each respective group negotiate which one another. Consociationalism can safeguard peace in socially divided societies according to Lijphart (Lijphart, 1969, p. 2012). Some of Lijphart's examples of consociational states include the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria. Certain characteristics of con-

sociational democracy, such as proportional allocation of jobs in the administration or a 'cartel of elites' (Bogaards and Crepaz, 2002, p. 358) are clearly present within the EU. However, other aspects of the EU system of government do not fit this description. Thus, the European Commission and the European Parliament are political institutions which do not fit the pattern of consociational democracy and a 'grand coalition' between different national elites (see Boogards and Crepaz, 2002, p. 359). Again, it becomes clear that the European Union has some characteristics of a consociational entity, but does not fully fit this category.

Multi-Level Governance

Another relatively new strand of interpretation is to see the EU as an entity of 'multi-level governance' (MLG), a term coined by Hooghe and Marks, as mentioned above. According to MLG, the EU is 'neither political system nor international organisation, but something in between' (Rosemond, 2000, p. 110). The most important tenet of MLG is that the boundaries between the different levels of government (e.g. European, national, regional and local, as described above) become increasingly blurred (p. 111). The question of whether sovereignty lies at the European or the national (or even the regional) level is therefore not seen in zero-sum terms by proponents of MLG (ibid.). Instead, they argue that the focus of the discourse on what the EU actually is should get away from focusing on sovereignty and authority and instead focus on governance (p. 110). Moreover, MLG emphasises the fluidity of policy making in the EU (Rosamond, 2003, p. 120). MLG seems to be a theoretical approach which conveniently describes what is going on in the EU. However, one problem with MLG is that it does not offer a clear vision of what the EU actually is (p. 120). This means that scholars working in this tradition usually do not have a clear vision of the direction in which the EU is developing (Rosemond, 2000, p. 120).

International Organisation
Finally, one could simply state that the EU is an international organisation (IO), in which states cooperate on a purely intergovernmental basis; for example like the United Nations. Arguments in favour of this view propose that the nation states are still the ultimate bearers of political sovereignty in the European Union. Andrew

Moravcsik (1998) argues that the most important claim made by authors who take an intergovernmental perspective, is that integration in the European Union has actually strengthened the nation states in Europe, rather than weakened them (Rosamond, 2000, p. 138). Moravcsik argues that the member states, and especially their executives, have received more room for manoeuvre and in-

POWER AND COMPETENCE SHARING BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND THE EU

EU MEMBER STATE POWER AND SOVEREIGNTY SHARING (EU GOVERNANCE)	HIGH ↑ MEDIUM LOW ↓		AREAS (EXAMPLES)
		Member states give EU exclusive competences	+ Monetary policy (Eurozone countries) + Common commercial policy + Common fisheries policy + Competition rules (for Single Markets) + Customs union + Some international agreements
		Member states and EU share competences	+ Economic, employment, social + Environment + Transport + Energy + R + D, space + Common defence + Humanitarian aid
		Member states fully manage competences (EU supports as necessary)	+ Defence + Industry + Health + Tourism + Education + Culture

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THE EUROPEAN UNION GOVERNANCE LOOP
The EU is a hybrid using governance components from three different models of power sharing and cooperation

EUROPEAN UNION

THE CONFEDERAL MODEL

THE FEDERAL MODEL

THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION MODEL

+ In a confederation, the power of member states is higher than the central government (in the EU, many critical competences remain with EU member states).

+ In a confederation, there is no direct contact with citizens (contact is via states directly).

+ In a federation, there is a strong central government but the power is shared (in the EU power is shared between the EU and the member states. Some competences are exclusive to the EU).

+ In a federation, there is strong contact with citizens (the EU is in direct contact with EU citizens via the European Parliament and European elections).

+ Sovereign nation states cooperating on an intergovernmental basis, like the UN (the EU member states agree and collaborate on some issues and disagree on others).

formation via membership in the EU (Moravcsik, 1994). In that sense, with a focus on the important powers of the member states, one could argue that the EU is indeed an IO. However, as mentioned in the above section, the EU has many competences which go far beyond those associated with and IO, deeply intruding into the member states' national legal order.

As a result, it becomes obvious that none of the theoretical models and concepts mentioned above entirely fit the EU. However, we see that the EU has many characteristics of the above models; especially federalism. The next section will describe how the EU actually compares with existing federal entities in terms of its political system and consider more ideational factors such as identity and 'demos'.

4. Comparisons to other federal systems: presidential or parliamentary? Identity or demos?

As mentioned above, the EU does not display all of the characteristics of a federal state at the moment. However, some characteristics of a federal political system are already present. This becomes obvious when comparing the EU to proper federal states, such as the United States or Germany. In the United States, a presidential system, the executive is represented by the President. The President is elected directly by the people. The legislature consists of the House of Representatives, in which each state is represented according to its population size, and the Senate, in which each state is represented by two Senators, regardless of its size. Most states also have a bicameral system in place at the state level. The highest court in the judicial system is the Supreme Court of the United States. In Germany, a parliamentary system, the Federal Chancellor is elected by the Bundestag, the lower chamber of Parliament. The Bundestag is directly elected by the people. The second chamber of the executive is formed by the Bundesrat, in which the German Laender are represented according to their size. Each Land has its own parliament, the Landtag.

Most importantly, federalism in these two countries has a long historical tradition. Germany has consisted of a number of states of varying sizes since the times of the Holy Roman Empire, and was only united in a nation state in 1871. The United States, on the other hand, were initially founded as individual colonies and only later put under the control of a federal government. To a large extent, there is still a tension between those who advocate stronger rights for the federal government and those who advocate more 'states' rights' (see Drake and Nelson, 1999).

In the academic literature, it has frequently been discussed to which extent the EU bears similarity to a political system with either presidential or parliamentary characteristics.

First of all, one can see the European Commission (in particular the President of the Commission) as the executive, the European Parliament as the lower chamber, directly representing the people (similar to the House of Representatives or the Bundestag), and the Council of

the European Union as the upper chamber, representing the member states (akin to the US Senate or the German Bundesrat). In contrast to the US system, there is no directly elected executive in the EU, i.e. the President of the European Commission is not directly elected by the people. The President of the Commission is agreed upon by the member states but then has to be elected by the European Parliament. In this regard, one might argue that the EU bears resemblance to a parliamentary system (Hix and Hoyland, 2011, p. 46). However, in contrast to parliamentary systems, the Commission is not really dependent on a majority in the EP, even though the EP can initiate the censure of the Commission (ibid.). Thus, it might be most appropriate to call the EU, as far as the selection of the Commission as the executive is concerned, a 'hybrid mix of parliamentary and presidential models', which is situated somewhere between the two, depending on the voting procedure in place (Hix and Hoyland,

THE EU IS AN INSTITUTIONAL HYBRID, MIXING PARLIAMENTARY (I.E. GERMAN) AND PRESIDENTIAL (U.S.A.) MODELS WITH CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPER FEDERAL STATES

EU TREATIES

The Executive Branch: Unlike the U.S., the Commission President is not elected, but is ratified by the European Parliament

THE EU COMMISSION (AND ITS PRESIDENT)

Supervises Commissioners

Appoints Commissioners

Proposes legislation & EU budget

Lower chamber (like the U.S. House of Representatives and the German Bundestag)

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Upper chamber (like the U.S. Senate and the German Bundesrat)

Represents EU citizens' interests (EU elections)

European Parliament and Council of EU have co-decision power to approve or reject proposed laws

Represents national governments' interests

EU LAW

EU BUDGET

Arbitrates

Supervises

EU COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT OF AUDITORS

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2011, p. 45). Therefore, one might argue that at the institutional level, the EU does already share several characteristics with proper federal states.

However, where the EU is fundamentally different from the traditional federal states is in the more ideational aspects, or more precisely: the sense of identity and the idea of a common European demos. Countries such as Germany or the US have a long tradition of citizenship and citizens generally tend to identify first with their country, and then with their state or land. The situation in the European Union is different. The vast majority of Europeans would most likely identify themselves with their country (member state) than with the European Union. It has frequently been claimed that there can be no identity or loyalty towards the EU to the same extent as the nation state, given that 'Europeans do not share a single common history, ethnicity or culture' (Bellucci, Snaders and Serrichio, 2011, p. 61).

However, a European identity would not necessarily have to replace national identities, or even develop in the same way, but could be 'different from, and more nuanced than "simple" national identities' (ibid.). Empirical evidence shows a strong variation between countries. Bellucci, Snaders and Serrichio, measure European identity as the extent to which people perceive Europe as salient and identify with it, based on the results of the Eurobarometer survey (Bellucci, Snaders and Serrichio, 2011, p. 64). Most countries lie in the middle of a 1 to 10 scale of European identity (ibid.). Using this scale, it becomes obvious that an individual's attachment to Europe varies considerably depending on the country, and is on average rather low.

However, where the EU is fundamentally different from the traditional federal states is in the more ideational aspects, or more precisely the sense of identity or the idea of a common European demos.

Furthermore, some authors claim that a lack of European identity, or of a European 'demos' constitutes a reason why the EU at the moment cannot be called democratic. Many scholars state that at present no common European

Demos exists (see Jolly, 2007, p. 73). A 'demos' can be described as the people belonging to a polity (Weiler et al. 1995). Most federal states, such as Germany or the United States of America, as mentioned in the example above, can be said to have such a 'demos'. It seems that the EU, in contrast, does not possess a common demos (see Jolly, 1995, p. 13). Because of this, the argument goes that the preconditions for democratic control are not fulfilled (ibid.). However, other authors, such as Andrew Moravcsik, argue that the presence of such a demos is not necessary for the EU to be democratic (Moravcsik, 2002).

But how could the political system of the EU be changed in order to become more democratic? Could a change in the institutional and political structure of the EU, making it more democratic, lead to a situation in which citizens identify more with Europe and care more about it, initiating a positive feedback loop? These questions will be discussed in the next section.

5. Which way forward for the European Union?

What could be a way forward for Europe in the current situation? To what extent is federalisation, or at least further integration, a viable and realistic option? Which alternatives are there? To answer these questions it is useful to begin from the end. Is there such a thing as an ultimate goal of European integration, also called a 'finalité'?

The first ideas of European federalism emerged already very early. In 1693, Wiliam Penn, the subsequent founder of Pennsylvania, wrote 'An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates.' (Penn, 1693). The idea then continued to be discussed, but without practical implications. Discussion of European integration in general and federalism in particular, only gained momentum after World War Two (WWII). Winston Churchill stated in a speech at the University of Zurich in 1946 that: 'We must build some kind of United States of Europe' (Churchill, 1946).

A famous proponent of a federal Europe was Altiero Spinelli. He advocated much bolder steps to European integration with very strong institutions at the centre (Burgess, 2000, p. 36). Already during the war, Spinelli published the 'Manifesto of Ventotene' in which he described the crisis of the European nation states and ar-

gued for the latter to become united, while preserving their capacity to express the diversity of the peoples of Europe. In the immediate aftermath of WWII, Spinelli clearly saw the United States as an example for Europe to follow. He stated that '…*the birth of the United States is of fundamental importance for the Europeans because in that experience it is possible to see, as in a laboratory, the basic factors of a problem that democratic Europe has to face today*' (quoted in Fabbrini, 2010, p. 35). He was later a key advocate of direct elections to the European Parliament. But what can we learn from his ideas for the current situation? Most importantly, Spinelli argued that the conditions for federalism in Europe were not that different after all from polities which finally became federalised, such as the US (Glencross, 2010, p. 118). Secondly, he argued that only a federal, or constitutional solution could fully solve Europe's problems (ibid). But how could it be achieved? Spinelli believed that a constituent assembly could draw up a plan for a federal Europe and

give it legitimacy, but he later had to learn that the European Parliament was not able to fulfil this role (p. 125). Later Spinelli hoped that federal sentiments among elites could lead to a federation, which would be legitimised ex-post by its policy output. However, in the current situation there seems to be neither the sufficient federal sentiments among European elites, nor a positive evaluation of the policy output of the EU (p. 126). The chances for a great leap forward in European integration towards a federal entity seem to be at an all time low, given low enthusiasm for further integration among the elites and the citizens of Europe.

More recently, famous political figures have made references to European federalism, and as a political idea it is certainly well and alive. In his famous 2000 speech in Humbolt University in Berlin, the former German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, argued for a 'European Federation' as a final goal of European integration (Fischer, 2000). However, he recognised that such a federation could not do away completely with nation states. Instead, in order to become a successful European Federation, the different histories, cultures and institutional particularities of the European states would need to be taken into account (ibid.). Fischer argues that a European Federation might lead to the construction of 'centres of gravity', i.e. groups of member states who cooperate more closely on certain issue, much like the Eurozone on monetary policy (ibid.). Indeed, the possibility for closer cooperation between member states on certain issues was already introduced in the Treaty of Nice (Phinnemore, 2003, p. 41) and the relevant provisions can now be found in Title IV TEU.

However, chances for a 'great leap forward' of European integration seem to be quite low. Firstly, a key problem is that, even in the academic literature, there is no agreement over how the EU can be understood at the moment, which stage of integration we are at, and, consequently, what the next steps should be (Glencross, 2010, p. 120). Secondly, federalism is understood in very different terms across the EU (ibid). Whereas in Germany, federalism is something which could safeguard and guarantee the continued autonomy of the nation state, the British perspective is that federalism is actually a threat to this autonomy (ibid).

More recently, famous political figures have made references to European federalism, and as a political idea it is certainly alive and well.

It is therefore apparent that federalisation in Spinelli's tradition is rather unlikely at the moment. So what could then be a way to increase public participation in the EU, and make further integration possible, at the current critical stage? How can a political climate emerge that is more conducive to further integration?

6. Policy recommendations: towards politicisation of the EU?

One leading scholar in the field of European politics, Professor Simon Hix, has argued that (limited) politicisation might be a possible solution for the problems facing the EU. Hix argues that there are two elements which are necessary for more democratic competition in the European Union: the first is an institutional structure which is conducive to more political competition (Hix, 2008, p. 110). Recent treaty changes have transformed the EU from very much a consensus-oriented system to a more majoritarian or competitive one (ibid). Institutional reforms in this direction include the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting (a system whereby no unanimity, but a supermajority of votes in the Council is required to pass legislation) to a larger number of policy fields, stronger rights for the European Parliament and revised rules for the election of the Commission President (ibid.). Therefore, on the institutional side the EU is already relatively well equipped for increased democratic competition.

However, the second element which is necessary in order to increase political competition is more competitive elite behaviour, according to Hix (ibid.). Hix claims that many of the problems described above (i.e. lack of popular legitimacy, the democratic deficit, low turnout at EP elections) could be overcome when there is more political contestation in the European Union (Hix, 2008,

p. 6-7). Therefore, it is not the political institutions as such that have to change, but the way the political elites act within the existing institutional structure (p.6). Indeed, treaty changes might not trigger different behaviour (Hix, 2008, p; 138). Instead, what Hix advocates is a change in informal norms and formal rules in the European Union (ibid.).

A possible way to achieve this would be to make the election for the President of the European Parliament more competitive, with each of the major party groups/coalitions in the EP nominating one candidate each beforehand (Hix, 2008, p. 141). This would allow important po-

sitions within the Parliament, such as Committee chairs to be allocated on a more competitive basis, rewarding the winning coalition instead of the proportional system, which currently exists (ibid.). As a consequence, the party system in the EP would realign, given that there would be a stronger rationale for parties to be part of the largest coalition. (p. 145). EP elections would no longer be treated purely as second-order national elections (p. 149). At the same time, voters would recognise the record of MEPs in the European Parliament and would then engage in the following elections (p. 145).

The democratic deficit and the low turnout at EP elections could be overcome when there is more political contestation in the European Union.

In addition, Hix proposes that regular debates on certain topics could be organised in the EP, in which the leaders of the largest party group could engage in a lively debate (p. 143).

Furthermore, the Council of Ministers should act even more as a regular legislature (p. 149). For example, all documents of the Council should be made accessible to the general public (p. 150). In addition, rights to amend legislation in the Council could be altered to make legislative deliberations more efficient (p. 153). Finally, all decisions in the Council should be subject to a vote and to a protocol (p. 154). The fact that the votes are recorded would increase media and public interest in the activities of the Council (ibid.)

As a third step, Hix suggests that there should be more open competition for the position of Commission's President (p. 160). At the moment, the nomination of the Commission's President takes place after political bargaining between the member states (p. 156). Hix argues that in order to make the process more competitive and democratic, the leaders of national parties should first make their approval for a certain candidate public (p.160). The candidates should then present a programme for the next Commission (ibid.) and hold a debate in the European Parliament (p.161.).

According to Hix, these steps would increase political competition in the EP. Citizens would then notice that more is at stake at the European level and would demand more direct involvement in EU politics (p. 6). This could help to foster the development of some form of a European demos, by mobilising voters across national lines (p. 184).

It is clear that important steps towards a more democratic and transparent European Union could be achieved without any fundamental Treaty changes, as illustrated by Hix (Hix, 2008). But ideas of stronger European integration and a 'finalité' do not have to be abandoned. A more 'politicised' European Union could bring the EU closer to the citizen, and in the long run foster increased integration; creating a European political identity. As detailed above, the current obstacles for further European integration are the limited support for steps towards further integration among the elites, and the limited identification of the citizens with the European Union. If however, more political contestation leads voters to pay more attention to the European level, they would become more attached in some sense to the European level, possibly forming a European identity or demos (Hix, 2008, p. 141). In that sense, politicisation might at this stage be a prerequisite for further bold steps towards integration. The current crisis is certainly a critical moment to embark on this path.

A more 'politicised' European Union could bring the EU closer to the citizen, and in the long run foster increased integration, creating a strong European political identity.

What Future for European Federalism?

If politicisation increases, a further strengthening of European institutions, and further economic and political integration, up to a point where the EU bears decidedly federal characteristics, akin to the way Spinelli and others imagined it, might come about. Indeed, this process will most likely not be gradual, and not necessarily symmetric. It might well be practical and more realistic to see a certain group of member states progress in this process much quicker than others. In that sense, the notion of 'centres of gravity' that Joschka Fischer mentioned in his 2000 speech carries some weight. What is clear, however, and has always been emphasised in the writings of the most outspoken federalists, is that the historical, political and cultural particularities of the member states always have to be taken into account. As Burgess puts it 'Federalists do not wish to create a "European nation-state" of the sort alluded to by Mrs Thatcher' (Burgess, 2000, p. 17). The notion of federalism is thus intertwined with the concept of subsidiarity, in other words the idea that political responsibility should lie at the level of government which is as close to the citizen as possible (Colombo, 2004, p. 5). When taking these factors into account, it is clear that Europe first has to become more politically salient to the citizens in a gradual manner, especially regarding federalist ideas and principles. In fact, these ideas and principles have a long and continuous tradition in European intellectual history and can certainly help Europe to overcome the problem it is currently facing. In doing so, Europeans can build upon the many federal elements that the European Union displays at the moment.

7. Conclusion

This global policy briefing has shown that the European Union is a political entity consisting of 28 member states, which vary greatly in their internal political organisation. Despite their differences, EU law has deeply influenced the legal order of the member states. However, there are some policy areas in which only the European Union can act, many in which the European Union and the member states share competences, and some in which continue to lie exclusively with the member states. But even in these policy areas the influence of the European Union can be felt. EU influence is not purely legalistic, but can also have a 'softer' form of impact on the institutions of the member states and the behaviour of national actors, a phenomenon called 'Europeanisation'. The impact of the European Union on the member states is channelled through the particular domestic institutional structure.

In this regard, the European Union already displays many characteristics, which are commonly associated with a federal entity. However, at the same time it also shares many characteristics of other types of political organisation, such as confederations, consociational entities, multi-level governance systems and international organisations. The political architecture of the European Union combines characteristics of both presidential and parliamentary systems, without itself being a state. While the EU in some sense shares characteristics with traditional federal states such as Germany or the United States, a crucial difference is the lack of a European demos. This is arguably a factor contributing to the "democratic deficit" of the European Union.

Therefore, while ideas of a federal Europe have been around for a long period of time, a precondition for further steps of integration is that Europeans have to care more about what happens at the European level. A possible way to achieve this is to politicise the European Union, as argued by Hix (2008). However, federal ideas have long tradition in European intellectual history and have the potential to play an important role in the future of European integration. The current European crisis is an important moment in order to revisit those ideas.

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"The EU urgently needs a shared understanding of how to realise its ambitious agenda. It needs to identify the measures required to adapt to the global era, and the costs and implications of standing still. In short, it needs to communicate a common vision of how Europe can secure its future. The choice we face is therefore clear: build on the strengths of the EU and use its collective weight to become an assertive and relevant player in the world, or cultivate fragmentation and contemplate the possibility of absolute decline in a world where the rules are defined by those who matter.

From the independent Reflection Group Report "Project Europe 2030" presented to the European Council on May 8th 2010.

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